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This paper examines how the financial structure and capital openness of a country have 
affected the likelihood of financial crisis over the past two decades. By applying a panel 
probit estimation to a sample of 38 countries, we find the following. 1) An economy with 
a more market-based financial structure is less likely to experience a currency crisis. 2) 
More capital openness is associated with a lower probability of a currency crisis. 3) 
Countries with a more market-based financial structure are also less likely to experience 
a currency crisis if that structure is coupled with a more open capital account. 4) Unlike 
what is found for currency crises, neither financial structure nor capital openness has any 
effect on banking crises. 
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  Several large-scale financial crises have ravaged the world over the past two decades. 
The first was the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the second was the global financial 
crisis of 2008. These financial crises have revealed the vulnerability of economic systems 
in both developed and developing countries. Many countries have been prone to financial 
crises both in the past and at present, and some are on the verge of a crisis. Because the 
determinants and impacts of financial crises vary by the type of crisis and by country, it 
is critical to identify the determinants of each kind of crisis in various settings. Numerous 
works have made an effort to investigate this issue from various perspectives. 
Two main empirical approaches have been adopted in the relevant literature. The first 
group of studies focuses on clarifying the determinants of financial crises. For instance, 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) analyze the effects of the twenty-first century’s first 
global crisis and suggest that domestic credit expansion and real currency appreciation 
have been the most robust predictors of financial crises for both developed and developing 
countries. Davis et al. (2016) estimate a probabilistic model to find the marginal effect of 
private sector credit growth on the probability of a banking crisis. Davis et al. (2016) 
introduce an economic model as a system for predicting crisis events that was very 
popular in the periods following the Tequila and Asian financial crises. Specifically, many 
researchers have focused on abnormal changes occurring before a crisis event. Sachs et 
al. (1996) report that overvalued exchange rates and lending booms coupled with low 
international reserves are necessary conditions for crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
find that after a prolonged boom accompanied by an overvalued currency, the 
appreciation of a real exchange rate episode can trigger a crisis. 
Several works have also reported that the financial structure, whether bank based, 
market based or a combination of the two, matters for economic performance. Such 
studies describe the superiority or inferiority of different financial structures by focusing 
on their political, legal, and protective aspects, among other factors. One of the most 
common approaches involves classifying countries’ financial systems as either bank- or 
market-based. For countries such as Germany and Japan, the bank-based financial 
structure has a positive effect on the economy because it offers advantages in terms of (1) 
acquiring information about firms to improve capital allocation and corporate governance, 
(2) managing risk and enhancing investment efficiency and economic growth, and (3) 
mobilizing capital to achieve economies of scale. On the other hand, in countries such as 
the US and UK, the market-based financial structure has positive effect on their 
economies by (1) creating stronger incentives for research firms, (2) enhancing corporate 




the early empirical literature, supporting evidence is provided for both types of financial 
structures. However, especially in recent years, more studies appear to report the 
superiority of market-based financial structures over bank-based ones. For example, state-
owned banks are associated with less economic growth because they tend to supply credit 
to fully developed industries rather than to strategic industries, where innovation and 
opportunities for growth are more feasible (La Porta, et al. 2002). In the post-financial-
crisis period, market-based economies exhibit significantly and consistently stronger 
rebounds than bank-based economies (Beck, et al. 2002). The banking sector played an 
important role in earlier years of economic growth, but in recent years, the stock market 
has played an even more important role in economic growth (Lee, 2012). Finally, some 
works find no merits for either bank- or market-based structures and argue that the overall 
development of financial systems, i.e., efficient legal systems and efficient capital 
allocation, is more important (Levine, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2002). 
In considering arguments for the role of financial structure on economic development, 
we believe that it is important to empirically test whether financial structure affects the 
likelihood of a financial crisis. A number of existing works in the financial crisis literature 
have focused on the financial vulnerability of developing countries. Some studies have 
had similar objectives as those of the present work. Frost and Saiki (2014) find that a 
more open capital account decreases the probability of currency crises. Kim et al. (2013) 
show that restrictions on the banking sector and entry requirements have decreased the 
likelihood of banking crisis, while at the same time, capital regulation and government 
ownership of banks have increased the likelihood of a currency crisis. Ji et al. (2019) find 
that a more market-based structure can reduce systemic risks facing the banking sector in 
China.  
Following the line of research described above, our main objective is to clarify whether 
and how financial structure and capital openness affect the likelihood of a financial crisis. 
We apply binary models, which include financial structure, capital openness and their 
interaction terms on the right-hand side, to 38 countries for the period of 1996-2016. Our 
empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, via a panel probit regression, we 
find that financial structure, capital openness and their interaction term play an important 
role in reducing the likelihood of a currency crisis but have no effect on banking crises. 
Second, after adding a set of control variables and changing the regression method, our 
qualitative results remain almost unchanged. We also find that while they have no effect 
on currency crises, the likelihood of a banking crisis is susceptible to changes in the VIX 
index, international reserves and the degree of democratic governance. 




financial structures. We seek to explain the relationship between financial structures, 
capital openness and financial crises. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to systematically investigate the impact of long-term financial structure data and 
interactions between financial structures and both types of financial crisis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and 
variables. Section 3 discusses the link between the probability of financial crises and 





With this study, we aim to clarify the financial crisis formation process over the long term 
and for a large sample of countries. Due to the availability of both financial structure and 
capital openness database, the study period covers 1996 to 2016 for 38 countries; the 
number of observations made varies with the availability of variables included in the 
regression. 
 
2.1. Financial crisis 
We first use Laeven and Valencia’s (2018) financial crisis databasei . These authors 
define a banking crisis as an event that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) 
significant financial distress in the banking system and (2) significant banking policy 
intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system. Significant 
policy intervention is considered to include at least three of the following six measures: 
deposit freezes and bank holidays; significant nationalization; bank restructuring costs 
(3% of GDP); extensive liquidity support (5% of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents); 
significant bank guarantees; and significant asset purchases (5% of GDP).  
The authors define a currency crisis as involving a significant depreciation of the 
domestic currency against the US dollar. Significant depreciation is defined as meeting 
two conditions: (1) a depreciation of the currency vis-à-vis the US dollar of at least 30% 
relative to the previous year and (2) at least a 10% higher rate of depreciation than that 
observed in the previous year. 
A crisis may continue over a number of years, or one crisis (of less than 12 months) 
may follow after another crisis (of less than 12 months); Laeven and Valencia’s (2018) 
database, however, only contains information denoting whether a crisis is observed in a 
given year. This limitation makes it difficult to distinguish an ongoing crisis from a new 




to econometric endogeneity problems because the macroeconomic explanatory variables 
used to predict a crisis in the later years of a crisis are themselves affected by the earlier 
years of the crisis. We follow the convention outlined by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005) and simply omit crisis years following the initial year in our basic analysis. We 
will handle this problem in section 5 for robustness check. 
Figure 1 plots the occurrence of the two types of financial crises, i.e., currency and 
banking crises, over the past twenty years for 165 countries. As presented in Figure 1, 
both crises show a two-modal distribution: the occurrence of banking crises is 
concentrated in approximately 1997 and 2008, whereas currency crises are concentrated 
in 1998 and in recent years. 
For data constraints, our sample includes 38 advanced and emerging countries for the 
period 1996-2016. Table 1 (a) shows the sampled countries and (b) lists all 21 systemic 
banking crisis and 17 currency crisis events occurring from 1996-2016, and Table 1 
displays the crisis distributions. We find that global banking crisis incidence peaks during 
the 1997 Asian crisis and with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, while 
currency crises are frequent after the after Asian crisis and peak again in 2015. 
 
2.2. Financial structure 
For financial structure variables, we use the financial structure database (updated July 
2018) developed by Beck et al. (2000, 2009) and Čihák et al. (2012)ii. Three variables are 
related to banking sector activity, and two are related to equity market development. The 
first four variables are constructed as the ratio of the two-year average of the financial 
variable to real GDP in the current year. The formula used is as follows: {(0.5) ∗ [𝐹𝑡/𝑃𝑒𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡−1/𝑃𝑒𝑡−1]}/[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑎𝑡] 
where 𝐹𝑡 denotes financial data for period 𝑡, GDPt is nominal GDP in period t, 𝑃𝑒𝑡 is 
the consumer price index (CPI) of end-of period 𝑡, and 𝑃𝑎𝑡 is the annual average CPI for 
period 𝑡. 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (prcb): Private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP is calculated from the above formula: 𝐹𝑡 is credit to the private sector in 
period 𝑡. These variables are drawn from the IFS database of the IMF. IFS indicator codes 
include FOSAOP, PCPI, and NGDP for F, P, and GDP, respectively. 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (smcap): This variable is the ratio of the value of 
listed shares to real GDP. F is stock market capitalization. The original data are drawn 
from the World Federation of Exchanges and Standard and Poor's Emerging Market 
Database. 




market exchange to GDP (World Federation of Exchanges and Standard and Poor's 
Emerging Market Database). 
Bank overhead costs to total assets (overhead): This last variable does not use the 
above formula. It denotes the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of 
its total assets. The original data are taken from the Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus 
databases. 
Following the methodology proposed by Levine (2002), we construct three indicators 
that proxy for finance size, activity, and efficiency. They are defined as follows. Finance 
size is the logarithm of the ratio of stock market capitalization to private credit. Activity 
is the logarithm of the ratio of the stock market’s total value traded to private credit. 
Efficiency is the logarithm of the ratio of the stock market’s total value traded times 
overhead costsiii. For financial structure (FS), i.e., the main variable used in our study, we 
use the first principal component of the size and activity indicator variables following 
Allen et al (2018). We also use the first principal component of size, activity and efficiency 
as an alternative financial structure index (FS_alt), and we use this alternative index for 
a robustness check of our main results in Section 5.  
Financial structure is concerned with the development of domestic financial institutions 
and markets. The degree to which external factors may affect currency crises and banking 
crises depends on how open and accessible financial markets are to foreign investors. To 
address this external channel, we include capital account openness (KAO) as an 
explanatory variable in the crisis regression. This variable is Chinn and Ito’s (2008) 
capital account openness index. KAO is based the binary dummy variables that codify the 
tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
 
2.3. Other control variables 
  In addition to financial structure and capital openness, we consider other explanatory 
variables that have been shown to have a significant influence on financial crises in 
previous studies. These include the reserve to GDP, inflation, political factors and the 
volatility of global financial markets. We review our financial crisis analysis of these 
potentially important variables based on a bivariate-dependent variable panel regression 
in this paper. 
Reserves to GDP (RES): This variable is defined as total official reserves excluding 
gold to GDP. As an indicator of international liquidity, a shortage of foreign reserves can 
become an immediate cause of a currency crisis. As Catao and Milsei-Ferretti (2014) and 




on currency crises. 
Inflation (INF): The theoretical effect of inflation is ambiguous from both positive and 
negative points of view. On one hand, inflation has negative effects by increasing the 
opportunity cost of holding money; on the other hand, inflation reduces the real value of 
debt and unemployment. Some previous studies identify a negative impact of inflation on 
economic growth, leading to an increase in the likelihood of a banking crisis (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999). Conversely, some studies find no evidence of inflation affecting 
banking crisis (Guerineau and Leon, 2019). 
Polity (POL): Data for this variable are taken from the POLITY IV dataset. The 
variable is computed by subtracting the institutionalized autocracy score from the 
institutionalized democracy score. We use the extended version of the POLITY variable 
to facilitate our use of the POLITY regime measure in our time-series analyses. We expect 
a country with a lower polity score to be more likely to fall into financial crisis. 
VIX: As a proxy variable expressing global uncertainty, we include a theoretical 
expectation of stock market volatility in the near-future VIX index. VIX has been 
confirmed to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of a banking crisis (Cesa-
Bianchi, 2019). 
 
2.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Of the variables 
related to financial structure, Activity and Efficiency show higher variability than Size. 
FS, an index representing financial structure, shows less variation than Activity and 
Efficiency, whereas the Alternative financial structure index (FS_alt) shows more 
volatility. 
The unconditional correlations between these variables are presented in Table 3. The 
correlations between Size and Activity and Efficiency are valued at nearly 0.4, whereas 
activity and efficiency have a strong correlation of over 0.9. Similarly, correlations 
between Financial structure and Size and Activity are valued at nearly 0.45. As expected, 
the correlation between Financial structure (FS) and Alternative financial structure 
(FS_alt) is high at approximately 0.95. We use FS_alt as an alternative proxy variable to 
Financial structure. Notably, there seems to be no relationship between the capital 
openness and financial structure variables. As a preliminary check to determine whether 
there is any relationship between our key financial variables and the prosperity of 
countries, we also compute correlations between GDP per capita and the financial 
variables. From the results, we confirm a strong correlation between capital openness and 




and GDP per capita, but there appears to be no correlation between GDP per capita and 
the two financial structure indices. From these results, we assume that financial structure 
is not only a proxy of economic growth (since, in general, a more developed country may 




Using a single method is limited to focusing on only one variable’s threshold and 
ignores the information provided by other variables. In this sense, the binary response 
models can make the best possible use of information provided by all explanatory 
variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005). We use a binary response models for 
panel data approach in this studyiv . To investigate the relationship between financial 
structure and capital openness with respect to financial crises, we estimate the following 
panel OLS regression equation (1) as a base model: 
 𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable of one when a banking or currency crisis event 
occurs in country 𝑖 and in year 𝑡 and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a country’s financial 
structure defined as an index indicating whether a country is bank- or market-based where 
a higher value of this index means that a country is more oriented toward a market-based 
economy. 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the value of the Chinn-Ito capital openness index. The Chinn-Ito 
index is based on binary dummy variables that the IMF classifies as restrictions on cross-
border financial transactions. 
  The effect of capital openness on financial crises may depend on the financial structure. 
We expect the effect of capital openness to be stronger in a more market-based economy. 
Because the interaction between financial structure and capital openness may have an 
important effect on the occurrence of a financial crisis, we also evaluate the influence of 
the interaction term 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡  on financial crises. This interaction term can be 
problematic because both financial structure and capital openness variables can take both 
positive and negative values, so that interaction term indicates positive for case (i) 
financial structure and capital openness are both positive, and case (ii) financial structure 
and capital openness are both negative. We will address this problem in section 5 with 
two alternative methods; however, the qualitative results remain almost unchanged. 
As financial shocks are transmitted to both banking and currency crises quickly, we 




explanatory variables are lagged by one year, the true correlation between the crisis and 
macroeconomic variables may be distortedv. Thus, we use year 𝑡 on the right-hand side 
of the regression model for year 𝑡. This approach is commonly used in studies in the 
literature (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Davis et al, 2016). However, we are also 
concerned with endogeneity problems where independent variables are influenced by the 
crisis itself. Our dataset includes 38 sample countries with 20 having experienced banking 
crisis events and 12 having experienced currency crisis events. We expect including both 
crisis and noncrisis countries to control for the reverse causality of crisis to independent 
variables and to mitigate bias in our regression results. 
 𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (2) 
 
  Finally, we add a vector of control variables as in equation (2) to check the robustness 
of the results of our key variables, i.e., financial structure and capital openness. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a 
vector that includes the inflation rate, official reserves, the current account and the CBOE 
volatility index (VIX), i.e., a popular measure of the stock market’s expected volatility.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we empirically investigate whether financial structure and capital 
openness affect the likelihood of the two types of financial crises by estimating the 
regression equations presented in the previous section. As emphasized by Cameron and 
Miller (2015), failure to control for within-cluster error correlation can misleadingly lead 
to small standard errors, and thus consequently narrow confidence intervals. Our 
regression models group sample countries into clusters, with errors uncorrelated across 
clusters but correlated within cluster (cluster-robust standard errors). The primary results 
are based on the panel probit modelvi. Column (i) and (ii) of Table 4 report results for the 
estimated coefficient and for the marginal effects of regression equation (1).  
The results for currency crisis listed in column (ii) show that capital openness, financial 
structure and their interaction are significant, which means that the more market-based 
the financial system is and the more open capital accounts are, the less likely a country is 
to fall into a currency crisis. Our result of capital openness being associated with a lower 
probability of a currency crisis is consistent with the findings of Frost and Saiki (2014), 
and the combined effects of capital openness within the financial structure, including both 
level and interaction term effects, can be strengthened nearly twofold. Our finding of 




financial crises corroborates the empirical work of Dal Bianco et al. (2017), according to 
whom capital openness helps mitigate the negative impact of an external shock but is 
conditional on the level of financial development. 
However, there appears to be no association between financial structure and banking 
crises. Additionally, echoing the results reported in Davis et al (2016), we confirm that 
capital openness has no effect on banking crises. 
Next, we add a set of control variables to the modelvii as in regression equation (2), and 
columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 4 report the estimated results. Both the signs of the 
coefficients and the statistical significance of the key variables, i.e., FS and KAO, remain 
unchanged. From column (iii) of Table 4, we find that Polity, the VIX index and Reserves 
to GDP have statistically significant impacts on banking crises. More precisely, a higher 
VIX index is associated with an increased probability of a banking crisis, and conversely, 
a higher reserve rate and polity score can reduce the probability of a banking crisis. For 
the currency crisis results listed in column (iv), in contrast to financial structure and 
capital openness, a higher inflation rate is associated with a higher probability of a 
currency crisis. From these results, it is clear that banking crises are influenced by the 
polity score, VIX index and reserve rate but are not affected by financial structure or 
capital openness, whereas currency crises are greatly affected by financial structure. 
More specifically, to clarify the effect of capital openness and financial structure to 
currency crisis. Based on the results of column (iv) of Table 4, we plot the marginal effect 
of capital openness conditional on financial structure and the marginal effect of financial 
structure conditional on capital openness separately. Figure 2 show that both capital 
openness and financial structure have a negative marginal effect to currency crisis in 
almost case. But for an extremely banking based financial system (under -2.7) and low 
capital openness (under -1.8), the marginal effect may work in opposite direction. 
  From the results of our basic and extended models, we can draw the following two 
conclusions. First, a more market-based financial system in a country is more likely to 
prevent a currency crisis but does not affect the probability of banking crises. Second, a 
more open capital account strengthens the negative relationship between market-based 
financial systems and currency crises. For a country with a market-based financial system, 
a more open capital account further reduces the probability of a currency crisis. Laeven 
et al. (2016) provide some supporting evidence based on a perspective that differs from 
ours. The authors argue that systemic risk grows with bank size and is inversely related 
to bank capital and that this effect exists above and beyond the effect of bank size and 
capital on independent bank risk. Our empirical results demonstrate that more reliance on 




developed and developing countries. Moreover, Langfield and Pagano (2016) argue that 
the over expansion of the banking sector is not only associated with more systemic risk 
but also with less economic growth. With the development of the world’s economies over 
the last few decades, both bank- and market-based financial sectors have become larger. 
However, economic yield sensitivity to bank development has also decreased, while its 
sensitivity to market development has increased (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2013). Overall, 
we expect both developed and developing countries to focus on a more developed market-
based financial sector in the future, which will benefit economic growth and stability. 
  From the results of our basic and modified models, we can draw the following 
conclusions. First, countries with a lower probability of experiencing currency crises are 
more likely to have a market-based system, but a weaker relation to banking crises is 
found. Second, capital account openness is associated with this relationship. For a market-
based country with more open capital accounts, the probability is further reduced. Laeven 
et al. (2016) provide further proof of this trend from the opposite perspective. The authors 
argue that systemic risk grows with bank size and is inversely related to bank capital and 
that this effect exists above and beyond the effect of bank size and capital on independent 
bank risk. We believe that a relatively more active market sector can mitigate the 
vulnerability of economic systems in both developed and developing countries. 
Simultaneously, an overexpansion of the banking sector is associated with more systemic 
risk and less economic growth (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). With the development of 
the world’s economies, both bank and market sectors have been become more developed. 
However, the sensitivity of economic yields to bank development has also decreased, 
while their sensitivity to market development has increased (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2013). 
Overall, we expect a more developed market sector to be more important in the future in 
terms of both economic growth and stability. 
 
 
5. Robustness Check 
  Our main results show that a more market-oriented financial structure can strengthen 
vulnerable currencies and that a more open capital account can magnify this effect. After 
adding a set of control variables to our base model, these results do not change. In this 
section, we further check the robustness of our results in the following four respects. First, 
we use a different transformation of our binary dependent variable by implementing the 
logistic panel method instead of the probit method used in the above section. Second, as 
mentioned in section 3, interaction term can be problematic because both financial 




will suggest two alternative approaches to this problem. Third, we also consider an 
alternative financial structure. The current financial structure index is based on two of 
three underlying variables, namely, size and activity. We also construct another financial 
structure index based on all three underlying variables, including efficiency. The 
estimated result is broadly similar to the results shown in Section 4. Fourth, we consider 
an alternative econometric estimation model, i.e., the fixed-effect logistic model with 
cluster-robust standard errors. We introduce one caveat in applying this estimation model 
to our sample countries: we include countries that did not experience a crisis during the 
sample period. For these countries, the dependent variable is completely explained by the 
country dummy, and therefore, the data are automatically removed from the regression 
process. Fifth, to avoid the possibility of macroeconomic explanatory variables being 
affected by the crisis itself, we adopt a two-year window to exclude the years after the 
crisis. We thus also re-estimate the random effect model for the subsample of countries 
experiencing a financial crisis and compare the result of the fixed-effect logistic model to 
that of the random effect model for the same countries. Finally, we adopt the receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve to test the predictive capacities of our models. 
 
Logistic panel model 
  We obtain almost the same result from the logistic method for our basic and extended 
models, presenting the same coefficient sign and statistical significance and similar 
marginal effects. From columns (i) and (iii) of Table 5 for banking crises, we find that the 
coefficients of Polity and Reserves are negative and statistically significant, and the 
coefficients of VIX are positive and statistically significant. Financial structure is 
statistically significant only in the extended model, echoing the results of the probit 
estimates. Columns (ii) and (iv) show that financial structure and capital openness remain 
as important factors related to decreasing changes in a currency crisis. 
 
Alternative interaction term 
  The interaction term between financial structure and capital openness variables can be 
problematic because both variables can take both positive and negative values, so that 
interaction term indicates positive for case (i) financial structure and capital openness are 
both positive, and case (ii) financial structure and capital openness are both negative. In 
this sub-section, we will suggest two alternative approaches to this problem. 
  Firstly, we distinguish the case in which both financial structure and capital openness 
are negative from other cases in which at least one of two variables are positive. Appendix 




represents financial structure and the horizontal axis represents capital openness. 
Interestingly, in the case financial structure and capital openness both have positive values, 
no currency crisis event has been observed. Appendix table A1 shows the result of basic 
and extended models. From columns (ii) of basic model, we find that after decomposing 
interaction terms to two separate indexes, the coefficients of both indexes are negative 
and statistically significant. For 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡(1,2,4) , it means the synergy effect of 
financial structure and capital openness remain as important factors related to decreasing 
the chance of currency crisis. On the other hand, negative significant coefficient of 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡(3) means, for countries with banking based financial system and low 
capital openness, the synergy effect may work in opposite direction. However, this result 
is not robust because we cannot find significant effect in column (iv) of extended model, 
  Secondly, we use the capital openness index modified to [0,1] interval, instead of the 
original index with the range including both positive and negative values. In Table A2 we 
find results almost consistent with the main results, only difference appears in statistically 
insignificant coefficient for financial structure in a currency crisis regression. From these 
robustness check, we find financial structure is important factor via interacting with 
capital openness in explaining currency crisis. 
 
Alternative financial structure index 
Table A3 in the appendix provides the estimated results for an alternative financial 
structure index, which uses the first principal component of the efficiency variable and 
two variables used in the other financial structure index. Echoing the results of the 
currency crisis model, we obtain statistically significant coefficients for financial 
structure and capital openness; however, their interaction term is no longer statistically 
significant. We attribute this result to the problems with the efficiency calculation method 
mentioned in Section 2 (see footnote iii). Alternatively, the interaction effect of the two 
variables may be not as intuitive as their direct effect on financial crisisviii. 
 
Omitting countries without crisis experience  
After removing countries not experiencing a crisis in the sampled period from the set 
of originally sampled countries, the results of the fixed-effect logistic regression based on 
the extended model with control variables are reported in Table A4 in the appendix. To 
make our comparison meaningful, we re-estimate random-effect logistic regressions for 
the reduced sample and present the results in Table A4. Even after limiting the number of 
sample countries, the results of the fixed effect and random models are similar to the 




likelihood of a currency crisis is mainly affected by financial structure and capital 
openness, including their interaction term. In addition, the inflation rate still has a positive 
effect on currency crisis probability.   
The results also show that in our model, the likelihood of a banking crisis is mainly 
affected by polity, the VIX index and Reserves to GDP. We also confirm that banking 
crisis likelihood is independent of financial structures and capital openness levels. 
Although we found a statistically significant negative effect of financial structure on 
banking crises from our extended model with control variables for the full sample of 




  Laeven and Valencia’s (2018) financial crisis database only identify the crisis 
occurrence year although crisis may continue over a number of years. To avoid the 
possibility of macroeconomic explanatory variables being affected by the crisis itself in 
the earlier years, we adopt a two-year window to exclude the years after the crisis. we re-
estimate probit robust regressions for the reduced sample and present the results in Table 
A5. Columns (ii) and (iv) show for currency crisis that the results are similar to the 
estimated results for the full sample. On the other hand, from columns (i) and (iii), we 
find the coefficients of VIX are positive and statistically significant, but the coefficients 
of Polity and Reserves are no longer significant. 
 
Receiver operating characteristic curve 
    To test the predictive capacities of binary classifier models, the receiver operating 
characteristic curve (ROC) has been applied in many previous studies. This approach has 
been widely used in laboratory medicine in recent years. It is also used to test financial 
crisis predictive ability in Davis et al. (2016) and many previous studies. The ROC curve 
is created by plotting the true positive rate against the false positive rate. If the area under 
the ROC curve is 1, the model makes a perfect prediction. If the area under the ROC 
curve is less than 0.5, the model is considered to have no predictive ability because it 
predicts outcomes worse than random chance. The closer the ROC curve is to the upper 
left corner, the higher the overall accuracy of the test. The ROC curve results are presented 
in Figure 3. 
  We plot the ROC curves for our basic and modified models using the logistic panel 
methodix. The top two panels are based on the basic model with panels A and B pertaining 




curve is valued at approximately 0.58, indicating that the model has a nearly 58% chance 
of providing the correct signal. It is thus difficult to determine whether the model can 
predict a banking crisis occurrence. However, for currency crises, we obtain a ROC curve 
with an area of nearly 0.85 even without the interaction term between financial structure 
and capital openness, which is not shown in Figure 3. After including the interaction term 
in the model, the ROC curve moves upward to approximately 0.87. It is thus clear that 
our model performs well in the prediction of currency crises. 
The ROC curves plotted based on our extended model are reported in panels C and D. 
Note that we removed one country (Lebanon) from the sample due to data restrictions. 
For banking crises, the area under the ROC curve rises to approximately 0.86. We confirm 
again the important roles of polity, the VIX index and reserves in predicting banking 
crises. For currency crises, the area under the ROC curve rises to approximately 0.90, and 
the inclusion of the inflation rate may have contributed to an increase in the predictive 
power. In summary, we believe that financial structure and capital openness in the basic 
model best predict currency crises, whereas polity, the VIX index, and reserves are more 




  In this paper, we investigated the effect of financial structure and capital openness on 
the occurrence of two types of financial crisis: banking crises and currency crises. Our 
main results are summarized by the following four points. First, financial structure plays 
an important role in reducing the probability of a currency crisis. An economy with a 
more market-based structure is less likely to experience a currency crisis. Second, capital 
openness is also an important factor in the occurrence of a currency crisis. Higher capital 
openness is associated with a lower probability of a currency crisis. Third, capital 
openness can increase the effect of financial structure on a currency crisis. This means 
that a country with a more market-based structure is more likely to enjoy a more stable 
economy in terms of reducing a sudden drop in the value of its currency by maintaining 
a more open capital account. Fourth, in contrast to what is found for currency crises, both 
financial structure and capital openness have no effect on banking crises.  
These results have important two policy implications. First, as many studies have also 
shown (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012 and Kim et al, 2013, among others), it is important 
to associate different types of crisis with different sets of macroeconomic conditions, 
especially for recent years. Restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements can 




power can reduce the probability of a currency crisis. In particular, the banking sector has 
come to play a much larger role, and its growth has led to the accumulation of debt in 
credit and assets, which has increased the probability of a banking crisis (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008). At the same time, financial market development can stabilize the foreign 
exchange market and mitigate information asymmetry, through which currency crisis 
likelihood can be reduced (Kim et al, 2013). Our analysis also confirms completely 
different sets of determinants of banking and currency crises. Second, developing 
countries must work simultaneously to foster the development of domestic financial 
markets and to open their capital accounts. Currently, a large set of capital controls tend 
to exist especially in countries in which domestic financial markets are relatively 
undeveloped and are more bank oriented. Frost and Saiki (2014) also point out that a 
closed capital account does not provide a country sufficient capacity to build a more 
robust financial market. In contrast, a country with a more developed and open financial 
market can mitigate currency sensitivity to external shocks. 
This paper’s main purpose is to distinguish the response of different types of crisis to 
different sets of macro variables. As heighted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), there is 
also interesting to analysis the effect of capital openness and financial structure to twin 
crises in future studies. Moreover, capital openness is also known as a constituent of the 
impossible trinity of international finance. In a seminal work on trilemma configurations, 
Aizenman et al. (2010) suggest that a crisis spurs a comprehensive reevaluation of 
international macroeconomic policies and of the international financial architecture. 
Policy makers will have to face constraints on choices posed by such a trilemma. In 
contrast, both the present work and Forst and Saiki (2014) confirm that more capital open 
markets can lower the probability of a crisis. We believe that clarifying the direction of 
causality between financial crisis and trilemma policies will be an interesting challenge 
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Figure 1 Distributions of the two types of financial crisis for 1996 to 2016 
 
 










Source: IMF Laeven and Valencia Database 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators, Financial 
Structure Database, Polity IV Project, CBOE Volatility Index, and author’s own 
calculations. 
 
Table 3 Correlations between the variables 
 
Note: Correlations are calculated for the full sample period of 1996-2016. 
 
  
Obs. Mean S.Dev Min Max Median
Size 798 -0.13 0.69 -2.46 1.64 -0.14
Activity 798 -1.23 1.31 -5.17 1.64 -1.03
Efficiency 798 3.55 1.45 -0.61 7.94 3.72
Financial structure (FS) 798 0.00 1.26 -3.74 3.36 0.02
FS_alt 798 0.00 1.51 -4.50 3.93 0.07
Capital openness 798 0.73 1.43 -1.91 2.36 1.07
Inflation rate (%) 798 5.82 9.69 -5.99 143.69 3.67
Reserves to GDP 798 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.99 0.15
Polity 789 6.27 5.10 -7.00 10.00 8.00
















Efficiency 0.371 0.899 1.000
Financial structure (FS) 0.491 0.462 0.382 1.000
FS_alt 0.445 0.492 0.398 0.949 1.000
Capital openness -0.089 0.019 0.062 0.041 0.074 1.000
Inflation rate 0.124 0.041 -0.027 0.017 0.004 -0.325 1.000
Reserves to GDP 0.158 0.078 0.102 0.107 0.107 0.092 -0.142 1.000
Polity -0.008 -0.032 0.025 0.001 -0.004 0.280 -0.057 -0.397 1.000
VIX index -0.058 0.089 0.075 0.058 0.092 -0.009 0.053 -0.038 -0.002 1.000




Table 4 Random-effect probit model panel robust estimates for banking and currency 
crises 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one when a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2. 
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.122 -0.495 *** -0.194 * -0.463 ***
(0.083) (0.152) (0.100) (0.151)
KAO 0.017 -0.806 *** 0.031 -0.679 ***
(0.067) (0.260) (0.088) (0.253)
FS*KAO 0.022 -0.276 ** 0.022 -0.242 **
(0.052) (0.120) (0.060) (0.119)
POL -0.043 * 0.001
(0.023) (0.024)
VIX 0.109 *** 0.009
(0.024) (0.024)
RES -4.578 *** 0.012
(1.541) (1253)
INF 0.004 0.017 ***
(0.008) (0.006)
Marginal effect
FS -0.007 -0.021 *** -0.010 * -0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
KAO 0.001 -0.033 *** 0.002 -0.027 **
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011)
FS*KAO 0.001 -0.011 ** 0.001 -0.010 *
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
POL -0.002 * 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
VIX 0.006 *** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
RES -0.232 *** 0.000
(0.084) (0.050)
INF 0.000 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Cons -1.971 *** -2.596 *** -3.782 *** -2.860 ***
(0.111) (0.338) (0.637) (0.650)
Obs. 798 798 777 777
Log pseudo-Likelihood -95.971 -64.230 -75.031 -60.092




Figure 2 Marginal effect of capital openness and financial structure to currency crisis 
 
 





Table 5 Random-effect logistic model panel robust estimates for banking and currency 
crises 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one when a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2. 
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.310 -1.055 *** -0.494 ** -1.005 ***
(0.204) (0.299) (0.232) (0.302)
KAO 0.050 -1.712 *** 0.087 -1.488 ***
(0.165) (0.513) (0.187) (0.517)
FS*KAO 0.064 -0.563 ** 0.096 -0.505 **
(0.126) (0.228) (0.130) (0.227)
POL -0.109 ** 0.000
(0.050) (0.052)
VIX 0.242 *** 0.021
(0.053) (0.052)
RES -10.518 *** 0.464
(3.542) (2.708)
INF 0.006 0.029 **
(0.017) (0.011)
Marginal effect
FS -0.008 -0.021 *** -0.012 ** -0.019 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
KAO 0.001 -0.033 *** 0.002 -0.028 **
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011)
FS*KAO 0.002 -0.011 ** 0.002 -0.010 **
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
POL -0.003 ** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
VIX 0.006 *** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
RES -0.251 *** 0.009
(0.092) (0.051)
INF 0.000 0.001 **
(0.000) (0.000)
Cons -3.710 *** -5.027 *** -7.721 *** -5.666 ***
(0.275) (0.690) (1.462) (1.421)
Obs. 798 798 777 777
Log pseudo-Likelihood -95.897 -64.640 -74.672 -61.068




Figure 3 Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves 
 
 
Note: Points located above the diagonal represent good prediction results, and points 
positioned below the line represent poor prediction results. The best possible prediction 








Figure A1  
 
 






Table A1 Two dummy interaction term random-effect logistic panel robust estimates for 
banking and currency crises 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one when a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.072 -0.494 *** -0.173 -0.442 ***
(0.114) (0.169) (0.164) (0.156)
KAO 0.038 -0.806 *** 0.053 -0.661 ***
(0.074) (0.214) (0.100) (0.242)
FS*KAO(1,2.4) -0.012 -0.278 ** 0.024 -0.254 **
(0.109) (0.118) (0.139) (0.128)
FS*KAO(3) (0.137) -0.272 * 0.080 -0.198
(0.173) (0.161) (0.216) (0.151)
POL -0.044 * 0.000
(0.024) (0.023)
VIX 0.109 *** 0.010
(0.024) (0.016)
RES -4.550 *** 0.048
(1.298) (0.833)
INF 0.005 0.017 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Marginal effect
FS -0.004 -0.020 *** -0.009 -0.017 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
KAO 0.002 -0.033 *** 0.003 -0.026 ***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009)
FS*KAO(1,2.4) -0.001 -0.011 ** 0.001 -0.010 **
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
FS*KAO(3) 0.008 -0.011 * 0.004 -0.008
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
POL -0.002 * 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
VIX 0.006 *** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
RES -0.231 *** 0.002
(0.066) (0.033)
INF 0.000 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Cons -2.020 *** -2.598 *** -3.801 -2.897 ***
(0.135) (0.311) (0.618) (0.692)
Obs. 798 798 777 777
Log pseudo-Likelihood -95.787 -64.233 -74.961 -60.068




capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2. 
 
 
Table A2 [0,1] capital openness random-effect logistic panel robust estimates for 
banking and currency crises 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.164 0.032 0.119 -0.001
(0.196) (0.140) (0.526) (0.152)
KAO[0,1] 0.017 -0.806 *** -0.408 -0.679 **
(0.062) (0.226) (0.544) (0.267)
FS*KAO[0,1] 0.096 -1.178 ** -0.130 -1.032 **
(0.259) (0.466) (0.776) (0.496)
POL -0.305 ** 0.001
(0.138) (0.023)
VIX 0.283 *** 0.009
(0.067) (0.016)
RES -30.346 *** 0.012
(8.007) (0.828)
INF -0.019 0.017 ***
(0.028) (0.004)
Marginal effect
FS -0.010 0.001 0.013 0.000
(0.012) (0.006) (0.056) (0.014)
KAO[0,1] 0.001 -0.033 *** -0.043 -0.027 ***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.058) (0.010)
FS*KAO[0,1] 0.006 -0.049 ** -0.014 -0.041 **
(0.016) (0.021) (0.082) (0.019)
POL -0.032 ** 0.000
(0.015) (0.001)
VIX 0.030 *** 0.000
(0.007) (0.001)
RES -3.222 *** 0.000
(0.404) (0.033)
INF -0.002 0.001 ***
(0.003) (0.000)
Cons -1.971 *** -2.596 -3.782 * -2.860 ***
(0.106) (0.311) (2.260) (0.682)
Obs. 798 798 777 777
Log pseudo-Likelihood -95.971 -64.230 -75.031 -60.092




(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one when a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2. 
 
 
Table A3 Random-effect logistic model panel robust estimates of banking and currency 
crises by alternative financial structure calculation 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS_alt -0.145 -0.552 *** -0.286 -0.549 **
(0.166) (0.209) (0.191) (0.218)
KAO 0.032 -1.168 *** 0.072 -0.979 **
(0.159) (0.389) (0.185) (0.391)
AG*KAO 0.034 -0.223 0.026 -0.216
(0.103) (0.171) (0.107) (0.172)
POL -0.103 ** -0.015
(0.049) (0.051)
VIX 0.234 *** 0.024
(0.052) (0.051)
RES -10.162 *** -0.075
(3.428) (2.600)
INF 0.005 0.031 ***
(0.017) (0.012)
Marginal effect
FS_alt -0.004 -0.011 ** -0.007 -0.011 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
KAO 0.001 -0.023 ** 0.002 -0.019 **
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
FS*KAO 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
POL -0.002 ** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
VIX 0.006 *** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
RES -0.244 *** -0.001
(0.090) (0.050)
INF 0.000 0.001 **
(0.000) (0.000)
Cons -3.657 *** -4.339 *** -7.484 *** -5.003 ***
(0.261) (0.508) (1.430) (1.316)
Obs. 798 798 777 777
Log pseudo-Likelihood -96.720 -68.758 -75.821 -64.670




respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one if a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2. 
 
Table A4 Logistic model robust estimates of banking and currency crises (omitting 
countries without crisis experience) 
 
Dep Var
Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.311 0.061 -1.386 *** -1.489 **
(0.314) (0.312) (0.402) (0.610)
KAO -0.186 -0.408 -1.869 *** -1.994 **
(0.190) (0.492) (0.680) (0.972)
FS*KAO 0.026 -0.031 -0.917 *** -1.156 **
(0.149) (0.167) (0.333) (0.528)
POL -0.135 *** -0.305 *** -0.005 0.087
(0.048) (0.084) (0.040) (0.100)
VIX 0.252 *** 0.283 *** 0.025 0.019
(0.053) (0.065) (0.034) (0.032)
RES -10.853 *** -30.346 ** -0.741 -0.610
(3.604) (13.822) (1.966) (4.203)
INF -0.006 -0.019 0.013 * 0.013
(0.009) (0.027) (0.007) (0.008)
Marginal effect
FS -0.012 0.006 -0.075 *** -0.137 ***
(0.013) (0.033) (0.020) (0.034)
KAO -0.007 -0.043 -0.101 *** -0.184 ***
(0.007) (0.049) (0.034) (0.038)
FS*KAO 0.001 -0.003 -0.049 *** -0.107 ***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.016) (0.039)
POL -0.005 *** -0.032 *** 0.000 0.008
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006)
VIX 0.010 *** 0.030 *** 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
RES -0.432 *** -3.222 *** -0.040 -0.056
(0.121) (0.708) (0.107) (0.417)
INF 0.000 -0.002 0.001 ** 0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Cons -6.699 *** -5.031
(1.633) (1.193)
Obs. 420 420 252 252
Log pseudo-Likelihood -60.881 -32.648 -48.352 -34.793




Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one if a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 







Table A5 Random-effect probit model robust estimates of window regression for banking 
and currency crises 
 
Note: ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The first two columns, (i) and (ii), and the next two columns, (iii) and (iv), 
present the estimated coefficients and calculated marginal effects for regression equations 
(1) and (2), respectively. Dependent variables are binary, taking a value of one when a 
financial crisis is observed in year t and zero otherwise. FS is financial structure, KAO is 
capital account openness, POL is the democracy index, VIX is the stock market volatility 
index, RES is the ratio of official reserves to GDP, and INF is the inflation rate. For more 
precise definitions of these variables, see Section 2.
Dep Var
Banking crisis Currency crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coefficient
FS -0.133 -0.533 *** -0.243 -0.485 ***
(1.342) (0.158) (0.158) (0.144)
KAO 0.018 -0.914 *** 0.056 -0.699 ***
(0.211) (0.252) (0.107) (0.253)
FS*KAO 0.022 -0.308 *** 0.014 -0.248 **
(0.636) (0.118) (0.076) (0.106)
POL -0.046 0.002
(0.052) (0.022)




INF 0.007 0.041 ***
(0.006) (0.007)
Marginal effect
FS -0.008 -0.022 *** -0.012 -0.018 ***
(0.074) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
KAO 0.001 -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.026 **
(0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010)
FS*KAO 0.001 -0.013 ** 0.001 -0.009 **







INF 0.000 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Cons -1.947 -2.719 *** -4.063 *** -3.143
(7.655) (0.354) (0.939) (0.677)
Obs. 756 772 735 751
Log pseudo-Likelihood -94.629 -62.672 -70.966 -53.552









iii As Levine (2002) also points out, the calculation of efficiency may cause problems. 
Instead of our efficiency index, Kim et al (2013) and Allen et al (2018) consider the ratio 
of value traded to overall costs of the bank sector as relative efficiency because the total 
value traded may reflect the efficiency of market, and conversely, overhead costs reflect 
banking sector inefficiency. However, the application of market efficiency to bank 
efficiency will introduce considerable bias. It is more reasonable to consider a higher 
value as denoting a more market-based financial structure. Consequently, for the 
calculation of efficiency, we use the original methodology given by Levine (2002). 
iv Specific methodological econometric issues of panel binary regression can be found in 
Greene (2012) and Wooldridge (2010). 
v Considering the endogenous problem, that macro variables can also be affected by the 
crisis event. We have also checked the effect of financial structure and capital openness 
in year 𝑡 − 1 to financial crisis in year 𝑡. The qualitative results remain unchanged, but 
the synergy effect becomes less clear. 
vi Since regular specification tests applied in a linear model, such as the Hausman test, 
cannot be directly applied in a binary dependent variable model, we estimated all pooled, 
random and fixed effect models. Because it can estimate partial effects for the specific 
countries in which we are interested, we present the results of the random effect model as 
our main results. The qualitative results remain unchanged for two other specifications 
and the corresponding results are available upon request. 
vii Due to missing polity data for Lebanon, we needed to decrease the size of our country 
sample from 38 to 37 countries. 
viii We applied our two financial structure calculation to pooled, random and fix effect 
models; the qualitative results remained almost unchanged. To conserve space, we only 
show the FS_alt random effect results to facilitate a direct comparison. 
ix We also plotted the figure using the logistic panel method and obtained nearly identical 
results.  
